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I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 20, 1895, Alcaeus Hooper stood before a crowd of politicians, family,
friends, and supporters in Baltimore’s city hall. “We feel that the election just held is more than
an unusual one,” Hooper bellowed, “[t]hat it has amounted to a revolution, and it demands a
change in the personnel of the many offices under the control of the municipality. The revolution
calls louder, however, for a change in the methods of administration.”1 Hooper was about to be
inaugurated as Baltimore’s first Republican mayor in a generation. He was a reform candidate
who had united Independent Democrats, Republicans, and the Reform League against Isaac
Freeman Rasin’s Democratic political machine. Political bosses had dominated Baltimore and
Maryland politics since the 1870s, acting as middlemen between the city’s powerful business
tycoons and a governmental structure that they largely controlled. In 1895, reform won
overwhelmingly at the state and city level.2 Many people were eager for a change they could
believe in.
In spite of initial gains, including election reform and moves towards greater municipal
efficiency, optimism for progressive change in the Hooper administration quickly cooled
amongst the Baltimore elite. Hooper refused to acknowledge patronage issues, and in spite of
some public support, had considerable trouble with the city council.3 In early 1897, a dispute
over the school board set Hooper and the city council against each other in the Maryland Court
of Appeals. In an April 1897 decision, the Court sided with the council.4
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April, in fact, proved to be an even more difficult month for Hooper, for it was also in
that month that City Health Commissioner Dr. James F. McShane informed the mayor that Johns
Hopkins Hospital had admitted a very strange patient. That patient, Mary Sansone, became the
center of Mayor and City Council v. Fairfield Improvement Company. Mayor v. Fairfield,
though at its most basic level a case of private property rights trumping municipal corporations’
police powers, also illuminates larger issues about the professionalization of medicine, the
persistence of public opinion, and the law’s precarious inhabitance somewhere in between. The
following paper first outlines the story behind Mayor v. Fairfield and the procedural progression
of the case through the court of equity and the Court of Appeals. Second, the paper discusses
nineteenth century medical views on leprosy and infectious diseases and the reluctance of the
public to accept these medical views. Finally, the paper analyzes how both medical opinion and
public perception impacted public health laws and judicial opinions at the time.
II.

MARY SANSONE

Mary Sansone was born in 1868 in Baltimore and lived there until 1884. When Sansone
turned 16, she travelled to Demerara to stay with her uncle.5 She stayed a few months before
returning to the states. A relatively healthy young person, she married Egnazio Sansone at the
age of 20 and had her first child at 23. Unfortunately, the child died while still an infant. She had
a miscarriage and was pregnant when she first noticed two mysterious brown spots over her
elbow.6
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Sansone’s illness progressed rapidly, affecting her feet and ankles and then her face, legs,
and arms.7 She went to a number of different doctors who prescribed various treatments, none of
which proved effective.8 After watching his wife suffer for six years, Sansone’s husband took her
to the Pittsburgh City Hospital, informing doctors there that she had been having “scrofulous
trouble.”9 Though it became a later point of debate, a physician working in Pittsburgh seems to
have diagnosed her with leprosy. The health department in either Pittsburgh or Allegheny City
set her up at a local almshouse that planned to construct a frame building within which to
quarantine Sansone.10
Rather than allow her to be quarantined in the Pittsburgh almshouse, Sansone’s husband
brought her to Baltimore in early April 1897. The couple stayed with relatives on Dover Street
for a few days before Sansone’s husband took her to Johns Hopkins Hospital, where she was
diagnosed with tubercular leprosy and admitted on April 7. The hospital notified Dr. McShane,
the city health commissioner, on April 10 or 12. The health commissioner initially attempted to
send the leprous woman back to Pennsylvania.11 Major James McLaughlin, superintendent of the
Allegheny Bureau of Health, refused to take her back. McLaughlin argued that
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it would be entirely foreign to the practice and usage of properly constituted health
departments to insist on the return of such a case, as it might imperil the health and
lives of many persons. If the Baltimore authorities attempt to send Mary Sansone
here it will be my duty to do all I can to stop them.12
Barton Grubbs, director of charities for the city, also refused to care for her, claiming that
she had never been registered as a leper there.13
While health officials tried to deal with Allegheny City’s lack of cooperation, they also
faced prejudice from locals. Johns Hopkins Hospital fielded numerous questions about the
danger of holding a leprous individual in the city. A Baltimore Sun inquiry about possible
infection from entering the hospital led Dr. Henry M Hurd, hospital superintendent, and Dr.
William Osler, professor at Johns Hopkins University, to issue official statements. Hurd asserted
that the “liability of contagion is almost entirely in using the same knives and forks and drinking
from the same vessel as the leper.” “Leprosy is not near so easily communicated as tuberculosis
and some other diseases that are prevalent in this country,” Osler added, “[t]he woman now at
Johns Hopkins Hospital could live in her own house, under the supervision of health officials,
and not be a source of danger to those about her.”14 Whether the negative public perception of
leprosy mattered would become an important issue in the case.
McShane worked diligently to find a place to send Mary. Requests sent to leper colonies
in Carville, Louisiana and New York City yielded little. Osler advocated sending the patient to
Bayview Hospital.15 An almshouse at the time, Bayview contained a mental hospital in addition
to quarantine facilities for choleric, tubercular, and other contagious diseases. Johns Hopkins
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University and the University of Maryland jointly ran the almshouse as part of their medical
training programs.16 Bayview did not respond positively to Osler’s wishes, arguing that it lacked
room and appropriate facilities.17
While McShane continued to look for other alternatives, city officials made a last-ditch
effort to remove Sansone from Hopkins. The Board of Health authorized the expenditure of $400
to renovate the former house of the resident quarantine physician at the old lazaretto grounds at
Fairfield/Wagner Point.18 The Lazaretto Point hospital burned down in 1836. A new quarantine
station, built in Fairfield in 1845, occupied a twenty-acre plot and housed mainly immigrants. It
also acted as a pest house for the city until the early 1850s.19 Most of the Curtis Bay peninsula
fell outside of Baltimore’s quarantine line, making it the perfect place to establish facilities for
the housing of people with contagious diseases. The hospital first came into use for quarantine
purposes in 1871.20
III.

FAIRFIELD IMPROVEMENT CO. V. MAYOR: PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 5, 1897, the Fairfield Improvement Company (“Fairfield”) filed an initial Bill

of Complaint against the Baltimore City Council and the Mayor requesting that the court enjoin
the City from moving Mary Sansone.21 Fairfield Improvement Company owned property
adjacent to the Fairfield/Wagner Point hospital grounds. In the initial Bill of Complaint, Fairfield
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argued that Mary Sansone’s presence would cause “incalculable loss and irreparable injury” to
the land owned by Fairfield because individuals would not buy the property.22
On August 13, 1897, Fairfield expanded on its initial complaint. First, Fairfield alleged
that the City had abandoned the property as a hospital and pest house, evidenced by the recent
burning of all the structures on the property, and that individuals purchased property from
Fairfield relying on that abandonment.23 Fairfield claimed that it had expended a great deal of
money in preparing the property for development and that industry had already moved into the
area, creating commerce.24 Fairfield argued that this abandonment and the subsequent reliance
prohibited the City from reopening the hospital. Fairfield’s second argument was that this
woman’s presence on the City property would be a public nuisance. Her presence would be a
nuisance because the surrounding residents would not be able to feel safe or peacefully enjoy
their homes.25 In addition, Mary Sansone would be a public nuisance because the City planned to
leave her in the care of the property’s groundskeeper and his wife, denying her adequate care and
increasing the likelihood of injury to the surrounding residents. 26
The Mayor and City Council responded to Fairfield’s initial Bill of Complaint on August
13, 1897 and filed an amended answer on August 14, 1897.27 In its response, the Mayor and City
denied that leprosy was an infectious and contagious disease that was dangerous to the lives of
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the individuals on the surrounding lots.28 Defendants also argued that Sansone would be properly
cared for because she would be under the care of Health Department physicians in addition to the
groundskeeper.29 The Defendants argued that the city had not abandoned the facility, but rather
that it had been in continuous use since 1864. The facility had not seen patients in recent years
only because there had not been a need for the facility. 30 As a result, the City argued that
Fairfield was not entitled to relief because it purchased the property with knowledge of the
hospital’s location and could not complain about its presence.31 The Defendants also refuted
Fairfield’s point that the City could send the patient to another pest house being used by the
City.32 Finally, the Defendants showed that the City was also expressly authorized by ordinance
to quarantine such individuals on property designated by the City outside of the city limits.33
On September 10, 1897, the Court granted the Anne Arundel County Commissioners’
petition to become plaintiffs. In their petition, the Commissioners argued that they had a duty to
protect the residents of Anne Arundel County from public nuisances such as Sansone and thus
had an interest in the case.34 During the bench trial and days of witness testimony, it came to
light that Fairfield had actually requested that the Commissioners become a party to the case, not
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the individual citizens of the county that they claimed to be protecting.35 It is unclear what
Fairfield’s motives were in bringing the County Commissioners into the case, but it is possible it
was to legitimize Fairfield’s main argument that the residents of the area would be impacted by
the Defendant’s actions.
Judge John Upshur Dennis of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City heard witness
testimony on December 16, 1897. Prior to December 16, the court subpoenaed, on behalf of the
Plaintiffs, a long list of residents and business owners of Fairfield and Anne Arundel County. In
addition, the Plaintiffs called the City Health Commissioner, Dr. McShane.36 The defendants
called one witness, Dr. William Osler, a doctor who specialized in infectious disease at Johns
Hopkins Hospital.37 In the end only a portion of the plaintiff’s witnesses actually testified in front
of the Judge.
During testimony, the plaintiffs stressed that the Fairfield residents were members of the
common public who feared leprosy notwithstanding the current scientific opinion that the disease
was not highly contagious. Thus, the public’s fear would cause individuals not to buy property in
Fairfield.38 The defendants, on the other hand, stressed that leprosy was not a contagious disease
and thus the public fear was unreasonable.39
Judge Dennis ruled on December 16, 1897 in favor of Fairfield and issued an order
enjoining the City and Mayor from placing Mary Sansone on the property in question.40 He
decided that the City had abandoned the property as a hospital and thus could not reopen the
35
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facility. In addition, Judge Dennis found that the market value of Fairfield’s property would
depreciate. The Judge placed great weight on the fact that the City could easily send her to the
other pest hospitals in the city where she would get proper care. The City and Mayor appealed
Judge Dennis’s decision to the Court of Appeals on January 8, 1898.
The Court of Appeals, in a decision written by Chief Judge James McSherry, affirmed
Judge Dennis’ decree enjoining the City and Mayor of Baltimore.41 It balanced the City’s duty to
protect public health and welfare with a private individual’s right to enjoy his property. The
Court of Appeals held that the City could not exercise its power in such a way that created a
nuisance and impacted individual property owners’ enjoyment of their property.42 The court
downplayed the medical view that the disease was not highly contagious. It focused on the sense
of dread that the disease conjured in the common public and that this sense of dread remained
despite medical opinion. According to the court, the basis for determining a nuisance was not
medical science but that the public views of leprosy would cause individuals not to purchase
property from Fairfield and thus impact property values.43
Further the court ruled that the City had abandoned the property.44 Fairfield relied on this
abandonment when it developed the surrounding property and it did not come to the nuisance.45
Finally, the Court ordered the injunction because Mary Sansone would not be cared for properly,
furthering the possibility of spreading the disease and the creation of a nuisance.46
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IV.

FAIRFIELD, THE CRISPS, AND AN EPILOGUE TO THE CASE

A. Fairfield and the Crisps
By the mid-1800s, the Crisps had become the dominant family on the Fairfield/Wagner
peninsula. Though they initially appear to have used the land primarily for agricultural purposes,
within a few decades they began to shift focus towards industrial development.47 In 1878,
Baltimore City bought and rebuilt the Light Street Bridge, increasing the viability of building
company towns on the peninsula. In 1882, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad extended to Curtis
Bay, further lubricating the wheels of development.48 By 1893, nine factories, including the
Baltimore Chrome Works and Monumental Acid Works, occupied the area. Of chief importance
to the development of the area was the establishment of fertilizer processing plants, which had
become an important part of Baltimore’s trading business since the middle of the century.
Fairfield area industry employed 2,100 workers, though only 221 people lived there.49 In 1891,
the Crisps formed the Fairfield Improvement Company, making hundreds of land transfers to and
from it. Though they claimed that it was formed to make sale of the land easier, the company
also served as a tax shelter.50 Regardless of the reasoning, the Fairfield Company felt that it
needed to protect its considerable investments when the city attempted to move Sansone to the
old quarantine grounds.
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B. The Death of Mary Sansone
While the litigants awaited the Appellate Court’s decision, Sansone remained in the
quarantine ward at Johns Hopkins. During her stay, public prejudice continued to act against her.
Rumors persisted that Johns Hopkins was going to “throw her out,” leading Dr. C. Hampson
Jones--McShane’s replacement as Health Commissioner--to declare that if it were to happen, he
would “take care of her somehow, if I have to take her to the City Hall annex and feed her
myself.”51
In early 1898, Mary W. Douthat, a nursing student in the Johns Hopkins nursing
program, caused a stir when she opted to quit the program rather than work in the quarantine
ward where Sansone stayed. The nursing school was quick to point out that at least thirty-four
other students had willingly served in the quarantine ward since Sansone’s arrival and that
service there did not even necessarily mean working with that particular patient.52 Nevertheless,
the incident probably did little to prevent even greater public apprehension from developing.
Sansone’s husband visited her several times during her stay, but did not continue living in
Baltimore. On September 4, 1899, she succumbed to nephritis and died at Johns Hopkins.53
Efforts were made to contact her husband, but he could or would not come back to Baltimore to
claim the body. The city buried her at Western Potters Field on September 7.54
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V.

ANALYSIS: MAYOR V. FAIRFIELD WITHIN A BROADER PUBLIC HEALTH
CONTEXT
A. The Medical Profession in the United States and Baltimore in the Nineteenth
Century.
One of the dominant themes of Mayor v. Fairfield is the disparity between public

perception and medical knowledge. While most researchers and medical professionals would
probably point to this as a major issue today, the disparity was all the worse in the latter half of
the nineteenth century before the professionalization of American medicine had reached
maturity. The organization and professionalization of hospitals began in the mid-1800s as a
growing urban population fostered the development of larger, more organized facilities. As
doctors began to organize, they also began to publish journals intent on distributing the latest
medical understanding and cutting-edge research to an ever-growing professional population.55
Technology played an increasingly important role as stethoscopes, ophthalmoscopes, and
laryngoscopes came into use. By the 1870s, bacteriology had come to play an important part in
medical practice, followed by abdominal and gynecological surgery a decade later.56
Still, American medicine lagged behind Western Europe, especially Germany, through
the 1870s and 1880s. The German model employed the use of large clinics, laboratory work,
high standards of training, and benefitted from a generally prestigious reputation. This drew
droves of medical hopefuls across the Atlantic from America until the first few decades of the
twentieth century.57 Not to be deterred, Americans soon began to close the gap, and in 1893,
Johns Hopkins medical school opened in Baltimore. The school introduced German clinical
methodology to American academia. It was built around clinical work in the Johns Hopkins
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Hospital, the same facility where Mary Sansone stayed and also home to a revolutionary nursing
school that had opened in 1889.58
William Osler became the first chair of medicine at Johns Hopkins.59 A Canadian who
graduated from McGill University in 1874, Osler taught at McGill and later the University of
Pennsylvania before coming to Baltimore.60 He had a tremendous reputation as a reformer,
modernizing public healthcare in Montreal and Philadelphia before coming to Baltimore. In
Baltimore, he specifically focused on fixing the “notoriously unsanitary conditions that
pervaded.” The battle against tuberculosis in Baltimore and elsewhere was one of his most
enduring contributions to medicine.61 Though Osler was not an expert on leprosy, his focus on
public health and contagious diseases led him to correspond with more informed researchers and
medical professionals about the disease well before the Sansone case. Like many other programs
during that decade, Hopkins’ initial scientific curriculum placed strong emphasis on the study of
infectious disease.62
Reflecting Progressive Era beliefs in professionalization and state enforcement of moral
activity, public health officials in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries began to move
away from campaigns for general cleanliness in favor of “specific measures directed against
specific diseases.” As Charles Chapin remarked in his history of the American Public Health
Association, “great health movements...teach right ways of living and offer treatment. The
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physician and the nurse are the chief agents of the new movement. They have taken the place of
the sanitary inspector and the policeman.”63
B. Medical Views on Diseases and Leprosy in the Nineteenth Century
There was a large yet incomplete body of information on the sources and impacts of
leprosy available to the City and court at the time of the Fairfield case. A widely-read medical
textbook from the 1890s defined leprosy as
A chronic infectious disease caused by the bacillus leprae characterized by the
presence of tubercular nodules in the skin and mucous membranes (tubercular
leprosy). At first these forms may be separate, but ultimately both are combined, and
in the characteristic tubercular form there are disturbances of sensation.64
Medical experts were in some disagreement about how exactly one could contract the
disease. There had been, for example, a theory that it could be passed from a parent to a child.
The accepted consensus at a leprosy conference held in Berlin not long before Sansone’s case
determined that it could not. By the late 1890s, prominent experts believed that leprosy was most
likely passed through the mucous membranes of the skin. However, evidence also suggested
that, as with smallpox and other contagious diseases, the clothing of the infected could carry the
bacteria.65 Around the turn-of-the-century, it was known to attack people of any age who had
been in extremely close contact with infected individuals. The above medical textbook suggested
segregation in cases where the disease was common, like Louisiana and California, and in any
other instance where family and friends could not be trusted to provide the patient with proper
care and complete isolation.66
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When Doctors Osler and McShane testified before the court, they verified the difficulty
of transmitting leprosy from person to person. Osler pointed to the fact that 500 other people
resided within one block of the Hopkins quarantine ward, where Sansone had been for three
months, and none had shown signs of leprosy. He went so far as to say that she could be there for
fifty years without any other cases showing up.67 Osler suggested that she be moved to the
Bayview Hospital, saying that it would only require the “ordinary, everyday precaution” to
protect the other patients from her condition.68 The two doctors would have undoubtedly agreed
with an 1899 medical textbook asserting that, “in this country...such measures [as forced
quarantine] would be cruel and inhuman, as they are unnecessary” when dealing with leprous
patients.69
C. Public Perception of Diseases and Leprosy in the Nineteenth Century
Assuming, as John Geise did in his testimony before the court, that most people regarded
leprosy in the same way they would smallpox, yellow fever, or any of the other epidemics that
ravaged the United States in the nineteenth century, regardless of what professional medicine
told them, the fear of leprosy at Fairfield would have been strongly associated with public
experiences with those diseases.70 Considering the effect epidemic diseases had had on the
United States over the course of the nineteenth century, it is reasonable to understand why the
public would fear something like leprosy that they associated with more communicable
maladies.
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Since the formation of the republic, the United States--and specifically Baltimore--had
suffered from countless bouts of typhus, yellow fever, smallpox, and other afflictions. In 1794,
yellow fever swept through Baltimore, killing 344 people.71 In 1832, a cholera epidemic struck
the East Coast of the United States. In 1866, another devastating cholera epidemic wrecked the
East Coast.72 More immediate still were the epidemics that affected Baltimore in the early 1870s
and early 1880s. All of these added together form a reasonable fear that the placement of Mary
Sansone at Fairfield might trigger yet another string of death and suffering.73
This fear, however, could only be considered reasonable if people disagreed with
accepted turn-of-the-century medical theories that asserted leprosy’s limited communicability.
Unfortunately, the case record shows that the residents of Fairfield were not going to accept this
medical knowledge. Of the several businessmen and doctors who testified, everyone felt that the
factory workers who inhabited Fairfield perceived leprosy to be a threat.74 Martin Wagner,
president of Wagner Packing Company, claimed that his employees “haven’t got sense enough”
to know that leprosy was not dangerous. William Crenshaw argued that some people might leave
because of Sansone’s placement in Fairfield but that, more importantly, others would not come
71
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to live there. John Geise and William Osler agreed that most people, regardless of class, were
afraid of leprosy and wanted to avoid it at all costs. Postmaster Bernard Miller made an
interesting point, reasoning, “Why everybody is afraid of it. Ain’t the people in the city here
afraid of it, and you want to give us your rubbish down there in the country where that building
is in.”75 This was a difficult point to argue against from the perspective of someone who was not
intimately involved in the health department’s decision-making process. The fear also seems to
have had religious roots. In his answer to the Baltimore Sun, C. Hampson Jones complained that
“if Christians would only remember less of the Law of Moses and would put into practice the
acts of Christ, the leper would be taken care of.”76 Osler’s testimony in court amounted to the
same, for the doctor complained that Fairfield’s residents relied entirely on Biblical teaching,
ignoring anything medical professionals said.77
Osler and his colleagues were up against a long, formidable tradition of public fear of
leprosy. As the doctors pointed out, much of this fear--at least in the Western world--stemmed
from certain passages in the Old and New Testaments, most specifically the laws outlined in
Leviticus. The Bible defines leprosy as “a rising, a scab, or bright spot...in the skin of the flesh,”
ordering that when these symptoms appear and “the hair in the plague is turned white, and the
plague sight [be] deeper than the skin of [the] flesh,” the diagnosed was to be declared a leper by
Aaron or one of his progeny in the priestly tribe.78 These symptoms obviously encompassed
more and excluded much of what had come to be called leprosy by the nineteenth century, but
nevertheless the treatment, that “[a]ll the days wherein the plague [shall be] in him he shall be
75
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defiled; he [is] unclean: he shall dwell alone; without the camp [shall] his habitation [be],”
persisted in the public imagination.79 More recent events, however, also gave people reason to
fear leprosy’s spread.
Marylanders living in the late nineteenth century would have been no strangers to leprosy
and its effect on their country and around the world. Americans had a long history of associating
immigrants with contagious disease, and leprosy was no exception. A 1900 medical textbook
claimed that leprosy only occurred in places where “the natives are dirty and promiscuous in
their habits, communistic in their modes of living, and who do not fear, but ignorantly invite
contagion.”80 Clearly this was a far cry from the clean, orderly lives lived by advanced, Western
societies. Osler, when identifying the origin of Mary’s case, was quick to assert that “the disease
never originates here; all the cases come from countries in which leprosy prevails.”81
Leprous individuals in the United States were mainly concentrated in just a few major yet
well-known areas. The West coast saw a number of cases due to the influx of immigrants from
Asia. China was well known to be a source of leprosy and many Christian missionaries from
Europe and America went there to establish leprosariums there to help the poor.82 In America,
white California politicians and journalists were already derogatorily referring to the Chinese in
terms of the leprosy they brought to the state. During the debates over the Chinese Exclusion
Act, California Congressman James A. Johnson exclaimed that were the United States to
continue to allow “the Hottentot, the cannibal from the jungles of Africa, the West India negro,
the wild Indians, and the Chinamen,” to emigrate, America’s youth would soon suffer from
79

Leviticus 13:46 KJV. When one considers that by 1900 Leviticus was part of an estimated 3300-year tradition, it
is easy to understand the challenge facing Osler. Estimated date ascertained from “Introduction to Leviticus,” New
International Version Archeological Study Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005), 155.
80
Morrow, “Leprosy,” 612.
81
BALTIMORE CITY CIRCUIT COURT (Equity Paper A) Fairfield Improvement Co. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 1897, MSA T53-281, Stenographer’s Transcript, 69.
82
Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in China: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 160.

18

“rotting bodies, decaying and putrid flesh, poisoned blood, leprous bodies and leprous souls.”83
Congress’s passage of the act probably did more to support than alter the public’s impression of
the disease.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the public became captivated with the case of
Joseph de Veuster, also known as Father Damien, a Belgian Catholic missionary who went to
work with lepers in Hawaii in 1873. Unfortunately for the evangelist, he contracted leprosy from
the patients with whom he was working and died in 1889. Father Damien’s death caused
considerable stir and a series of sensationalized newspaper accounts, biographies, and memoirs.
Damien was one of a very small number of missionaries and religiously-affiliated leprosarium
workers who caught the disease; nevertheless, the public was fixated with case because of the
possibility of contagion. It seemed to justify fears that leprosy could be easily spread.
If Baltimoreans or the residents at Fairfield had forgotten Father Damien’s case by the
mid-1890s, they would have had their memories jogged upon reading an account in the Sun of
Dr. H. Allen Tupper’s trip to Hawaii, complete with a write-up of his impressions on the island’s
leper colony and Father Damien’s still-resonant legacy.84 The fear of leprosy via Hawaii
remained relevant in the later 1890s, with Osler noting in his article on Sansone that “[i]n the
question of the annexation of Hawaii the danger of leprosy also has come up.” As he attempted
to do before the court and in his statement to the Sun, Osler expressed an opinion that leprosy
would not become an issue in the United States.85
Baltimoreans would also have been familiar, particularly after it was discussed in the
Sun, with leper colonies in Minnesota, New York, and Louisiana. Minnesota’s lepers had been
brought from Norway in the mid-1800s. Their population was decreasing by the latter half of the
83
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century, and they had in fact been released by the time McShane attempted to remove Sansone
there.86 The state of Louisiana opened the Louisiana Leper Home in 1894 near the town of
Carville. Though Charity Hospital in New Orleans had been treating leprous patients since the
1850s, America’s increasing presence on the international scene during the second half of the
nineteenth century drew greater attention to previously discussed fears of leprosy.87 In 1896, the
state handed the failing hospital over to the Sisters of Charity, an order of nuns who immediately
began enacting reforms.88 It soon became the most famous leprosarium in the country.
Generally, public perception had consistently lagged behind leading research for much of
early modern and modern history, often with frightening results. In the 1780s, a “Doctors’ Mob”
in New York City attempted to lynch an anatomist.89 As the nineteenth century developed, strong
anti-elitist trends led to a severe backlash of the American public against lawyers, doctors, and
high church ministers. In medicine, this led to the rise of the Thomsonian school, a system
focusing on botanic remedies that had established itself in every eastern state by the 1830s.
Thomsonians asserted that, when it came to issuing medical treatment, “people are certainly
capable of judging for themselves.”90 As late as the 1910s, Mary Mallon, alias “Typhoid Mary,”
stubbornly refused to believe doctors’ assertions that she was a healthy carrier of typhoid
infecting others with the deadly condition.91 Even within the medical profession, many findings
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did not immediately catch. Ignaz Semmelweis’ finding in 1847 that obstetricians who washed
their hands reduced deaths of puerperal (or childbed) fever from eighteen percent to one percent
was not accepted until Louis Pasteur discovered bacteria in 1879.92
Considering the wide-ranging public knowledge of leprosy in the late 1800s, one can
reasonably assume that the residents of Fairfield had an acute knowledge of the presence of the
disease. That knowledge, coupled with their impression of the disease as extremely contagious
and deadly, placed them in diametric opposition to the general consensus of medical knowledge
at the time. This difference put the court in a precarious position, attempting to gratify both the
scientific truths of their time and the public they knew would be reluctant to accept them.
D. Nineteenth Century Public Health Laws: Medical Knowledge v. Public
Perception
Before analyzing the judicial balance of medical opinion and public perception in
infectious disease cases, we should establish how the public health laws that empowered the
government to protect public welfare also struggled with this balance. As mentioned above, the
nineteenth century in America and in Baltimore was marked with significant breakthroughs in
terms of the medical profession and medical knowledge. However, it was also a time of
significant public apprehension towards those breakthroughs and the medical profession
generally. The conflict between these two perspectives seemed to come to a head in the public
health laws developing in cities and states around the country in the nineteenth century.
The development of Baltimore City and Maryland state public health laws are prime
examples of this conflict. On the one hand, the laws were influenced by scientific advancements,
but on the other hand there was often a considerable lag between medical breakthroughs and
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incorporation of these breakthroughs into the laws. 93 One reason is the susceptibility of
lawmakers to public fears and apprehensions. Public opinion is often influenced by antiquated
ideas and fears. As elected officials, lawmakers have to be sensitive to their constituents’
traditional and religious beliefs even if they may be less than compatible with scientific
advancement.94 A second reason is the lack of sophistication of the lawmakers themselves.
Lawmakers are not always tapped into progressive medical breakthroughs.95 Tuberculosis in
Philadelphia is a prime example of this lag. Throughout the nineteenth century medical and
political officials in Philadelphia went back and forth on the true contagiousness of the disease,
resulting in no government actions to limit the disease until 1930.96 This disconnect is bridged as
society becomes more affluent and sophisticated. A more sophisticated society elects more
knowledgeable lawmakers who are tapped into the contemporary medical scene. 97
Baltimore’s initial public health laws, Ordinances 11 and 15 passed in 1797, empowered
the city government to take government action against contagious and infectious diseases.
Ordinance 11 was intended to prevent the spreading of “pestilential and other infectious
diseases” in the city.98 The Ordinance also defined a public nuisance in the city and established a
Health Department with nine commissioners. The commissioners were given the duty to prevent
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nuisances in the city.99 Ordinance 15 further expanded on the commissioners’ duties and created
city sanitation duties including cleaning sidewalks, the beginning of garbage pickup by the city,
and municipal street cleaning.100
In 1801, the City gave the commissioners the power to quarantine individuals in order to
prevent the spread of contagious disease. The commissioners were given “full power to remove
any person afflicted with contagious disease to a hospital or other place” and were given the
authority to quarantine an infected house. 101 In 1853, The City created the health warden
position and stationed one in each district. The health warden was tasked with reporting nuisance
dangers in his district to help prevent the spread of disease.102
Following these ordinances, the city’s public health laws fluctuated with changing
medical views. Fluctuations included modifying laws as a result of new scientific views on the
causes and impacts of disease and shifting the focus of prevention from sanitation to medical
treatments such as vaccination. Underlying all these changes, however, was the lag time between
discovery of scientific advancement and incorporation of advancement into the public health
laws. In addition, there was a move away from laws focusing on government responsibilities
toward laws outlining private duties and responsibilities in preventing disease.
Throughout the nineteenth century doctors and scientists uncovered the true impacts and
causes of infectious and contagious diseases. As a result, laws dealing with the prevention of
certain diseases seemed constantly in flux. For example, reportable disease lists began in 1820
when the City required physicians to report cases they diagnosed of a limited number of
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contagious diseases. Failure to report resulted in a penalty of $100 for noncompliance.103 In
1869, smallpox was removed from the list because it was believed the disease was no longer a
threat.104 However, in 1882, smallpox was back on the list of reportable diseases along with
cholera, yellow fever, malignant diphtheria, and scarlet fever. In 1890, 1895 and 1896 the list of
reportable diseases expanded to include a larger number of diseases. Leprosy was first included
on the 1920 list.105 The expansion of the list of diseases that had to be reported is an example of
how the laws changed as views of disease changed.
As mentioned above, the law was not always quick to catch up with medical
breakthroughs, and laws regulating the spread of infectious disease were no exception. For
example, the Baltimore City quarantine laws were modified numerous times during this period,
much like the reportable disease registries. In the late eighteenth century, yellow fever was
thought to be a contagious disease that was brought into Baltimore City through the ports. As a
result of the numerous yellow fever outbreaks at that time, the early quarantine laws were drafted
based on these impressions and were not concerned with the spread of other diseases.106
As early as 1797, however, doctors were reporting that yellow fever was not contagious
but rather infectious and originated locally.107 Throughout the early nineteenth century,
physicians recommended the repeal of quarantine laws because they were ineffective in
preventing yellow fever.108 The lawmakers finally responded to the doctors’ recommendations in
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1820, almost 20 years after the initial recommendation, by repealing the City’s quarantine laws.
In 1826, the City reinstated the quarantine laws because of new fears of smallpox and typhus
fever from new immigrants.109 Finally, the quarantine laws were rewritten without specific
diseases in mind, instead giving the health commissioners discretion on how to prevent the
spread of disease. In 1880, the federal government instituted uniform quarantine laws for all
ports that preempted all Baltimore City local laws. 110
In regards to quarantine laws, there were also times where the public never accepted
medical opinions and as a result, the laws never incorporated these opinions. During the 1832
cholera outbreak in the city lawmakers were considering quarantine measures to prevent the
spread of disease. Doctors in the city recommended against quarantine measures because the
disease was not in fact contagious. However, notwithstanding the medical recommendation,
lawmakers instituted quarantine measures because of opposition from the public.111
As discussed above, initial City public health laws were focused on sanitation in the form
of cleaning up the public and private realm. These laws continued to be important and continued
to develop throughout the nineteenth century. During this time medical treatments also became
widely accepted by the medical community as alternative methods to prevent disease.112 Much
like the quarantine laws, in some situations, these medical treatments were available for decades
before they were used, primarily because of the public’s inability to accept the new treatment
methods.113
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The discovery of the smallpox vaccine is an example of a medical breakthrough that
revolutionized prevention of disease in the country and the City of Baltimore once it was finally
widely accepted and incorporated into law.114 The smallpox inoculation was available as early as
the mid-eighteenth century in cities like New York. The inoculation would introduce a mild case
of smallpox under the skin to build up antibodies. It was quite dangerous because inoculated
individuals became contagious and could pass on the disease to others. Thus, the inoculation did
not become widely accepted. In 1801, a doctor in England discovered a smallpox vaccine where
an individual would be injected with cowpox. Vaccinated people were immune to smallpox but
did not pass on the disease. Despite this discovery, there were strong public movements in cities
across the country against the vaccine because of the misconception that it was just as dangerous
as inoculation. This opposition often convinced lawmakers not to incorporate the vaccine into
disease prevention.115
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Baltimore City and the State of Maryland
began integrating the vaccine into smallpox prevention. In 1882, Baltimore City health
commissioners were given the power to order the vaccination of any individual who would not
voluntary submit to a vaccination against smallpox. In addition, the state of Maryland passed a
law in 1864 that every parent had to vaccinate their child before their first birthday. Children
who had not been vaccinated could not attend school, and physicians who did not vaccinate
could be penalized.116
At times more than just medical breakthroughs caused public apprehension of new
treatments; sometimes the lack of public acceptance was due to the fear that such a treatment
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would impinge on an individual’s constitutional right. A primary example of this was the antismallpox vaccination movement in New York City during this time. The anti-vaccination
movement argued that compulsory vaccination violated personal liberties and was too much
government intervention in a citizen’s private life. New York lawmakers listened to the public
concerns and focused on educating the public about the benefit of the vaccine instead of
instituting mandatory vaccination.117
The Supreme Court settled this issue in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The Supreme Court
ruled that compulsory vaccinations were not unconstitutional because private liberties were no
more important than public safety, but the state could not vaccinate someone against his or her
will.118 The state could arrest an individual who refused to get vaccinated, but it could not
forcibly vaccinate the individual. Thus, smallpox and other diseases still spread as immigrants
continued to refuse to get vaccinated. In the end, public health officials in New York and cities
around the country passed laws conditioning school attendance on vaccination.119 As mentioned
above, Baltimore City instituted a similar law in regards to vaccination and school attendance. 120
The Progressive Era also saw a movement towards more personal responsibilities in
terms of the protection of personal and public health. The public health law realm was no
exception to that trend. In the late-nineteenth century, the City passed laws requiring private
individuals to do their part in preventing disease. Beginning in 1886, private homes had to
provide suitable garbage disposal containers. Individuals had to dispose of their garbage in those
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containers and were prohibited from throwing their refuse into the street. Around the same time,
the City passed laws requiring that private homes be maintained in habitable conditions,
including a suitable roof, good and sufficient number of water closets, and keeping the home and
surrounding environment free of garbage and refuse. The City hired building and plumbing
inspectors to make sure the laws were being followed. In the early-twentieth century, these laws
were codified into a comprehensive building code for the City. 121 In addition, the state of
Maryland made it a crime to expose others to disease and to rent a space in your home without
disinfecting that space after a diseased individual had resided there.122
This movement towards more personal responsibility did not stop city and state
governments from maintaining the public power to prevent disease, even at the expense of
private rights. Maryland did not shy away from the public power. The state of Maryland passed a
law in 1882 that gave city health authorities the power to disinfect private property.123
In the development of the public health laws underlying the Mayor v. Fairfield case,
lawmakers often did a preliminary balancing of current scientific advancements and public
perception of those advances. Consequently, the public health laws were written with these
conflicting views in mind. However, this fact did not prevent the courts from further balancing
these interests during proceedings interpreting the public health laws. Judge Dennis’ and
McSherry’s opinions were no exceptions. The judges considered the public perception of leprosy
in deciding Mayor v. Fairfield case.
E.

Judicial Interpretation of Infectious Disease Cases

During the nineteenth century, courts around the country heard numerous cases involving
new public health laws. The courts also found themselves reviewing these laws with public
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opinion of medical breakthroughs in mind. Courts seemed to analyze harmful nuisances and
disease from the starting point of public perception and not from medical knowledge of the
event. Mayor v. Fairfield is a prime example of these numerous considerations of the court.
In Mayor v. Fairfield, the court stressed how the standard for determining a nuisance
should not be whether the disease was actually contagious but “whether, viewed as it is by the
people generally, its introduction into a neighborhood is calculated to do serious injury to the
property of the plaintiff.”124 Thus the court looked at public fear of leprosy and how that would
impact Fairfield’s property values despite the fact that the disease is not actually contagious.
“There are modern theories and opinions of medical experts that the contagion is remote… but
the popular belief of its peril…cannot in this day be shaken or dispelled by mere scientific
asseveration or conjecture.”125 The court ruled that in determining a nuisance one needed to look
at how the public portrayed the harmful event and not necessarily the actual impact of that
event.126
It appears that the Fairfield court’s interpretation of public perception in the
determination of a nuisance was in line with a general judicial trend. In Birchard v. Board of
Health of City of Lansing, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a pest house could not be
placed in a crowded district because even though “there might be no actual danger if properly
conducted…their maintenance in close proximity to the home would create such dread and fear
in the mind of the normal person as would destroy… the property rights of the plaintiff.”127
Similarly, in Kirk v. Wyman, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the facilities within
which the board of health was planning to house a female leper were unfit. Despite the ruling,
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the court noted that if the facilities were fit, the board of health had every right to quarantine the
plaintiff, even though her form of leprosy was only slightly contagious, because of how the
particular disease was regarded by the public.128
Thus, just like lawmakers, judges were aware of the general public’s fear of new medical
advancements and took that into account when ruling on infectious disease nuisance cases.
Judge Dennis and McSherry were not constructing novel approaches to nuisance law when
deciding the Mayor v. Fairfield case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Like any legal case, Mayor v. Fairfield did not occur in a vacuum. Playing upon it were
wider and farther-reaching legal, historical, and social trends. The case took place at the end of a
century wrought with contagious and infectious diseases that had devastating effects on the
American people. An ill-informed public, unwilling to break with its traditional understanding of
leprosy, associated Sansone’s condition with more traumatizing epidemics. The century also saw
a great upheaval in medical knowledge as doctors strove to introduce their findings to an
unprepared world. As evidenced by its inconsistent application of scientific and medical
understanding throughout the century, law often had to adopt a role of reconciliation between the
divergent interests of public and medical beliefs. As a corollary, the arrival of the Progressive
Era at the turn-of-the-century brought greater focus on expert opinion (read: that of the doctors)
and the public’s responsibility for the maintenance of a healthy society, initiating a legal shift
from the preeminence of private property to public health rights. Fairfield demonstrates the way
that these loosely associated trends were beginning to—but had not fully—come together by
1897. In so doing, it sharpens our impression of the way that law cannot be disassociated from
the times and opinions in which it is decided and made.
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